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Abstract
We present a theoretical as well as empirical analysis of the impact of employment regu-
lations on permanent and temporary employment. We consider three diﬀerent forms of such
regulations, namely insider protection, ﬁxed term contract regulations, and legislation on tem-
porary work agencies, and we present some empirical evidence as regards total, female and
young employees based on a panel of nine European countries. We show that these three types
of regulations have diﬀerent impacts on the employment performances of those countries. More-
over, these institutions act asymmetrically along the business cycle. The most notable ﬁndings
are that lower employment protection leads to the substitution of permanent employees by tem-
porary ones with an insigniﬁcant net eﬀect on the total; more ﬂexible regulations on ﬁxed term
contracts have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on temporary as well as permanent employment among young
people; ﬂexible regulations on temporary work agencies have a positive impact on temporary
employment, while they may reduce permanent employment.
JEL codes: J21, J23, E24.
Keywords: Fixed Term Contracts, Temporary Work Agencies, Temporary Employment,
Labour Market Institutions, Employment protection.
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21 Introduction
In recent decades European economies have experienced high levels of unemployment and, unlike
in the USA, high degrees of persistence. Employment protection legislation has often been put
forward as a possible explanation for the poor performance of European labour markets, and the
ﬂexibilization of labour relations has been one of the more debated themes in industrial relations
and economic analysis in Europe.
One of the main ways in which European labour markets have pursued higher levels of ﬂexibility
is the adoption of new models of labour contracts for entrants, rather than by reducing the level
of employment protection for insiders1. Increasingly frequent use has been made of temporary
contracts in the last decade in most of the European countries, and notably in Spain (see Bentolila
and Dolado (1994) and Bentolila and Saint Paul (1992)).
Nevertheless, most of the economic literature focuses on severance payments and ﬁring costs
rather than on temporary contracts. The main results of this literature are that, whereas higher
ﬁring costs reduce the variability of employment along the economic cycle, the eﬀect on average
employment is less clear (Bertola (1992) ). As a matter of fact, some authors provide cases in which
average employment grows with ﬁring costs, as in Bentolila and Bertola (1990).
Temporary contracts have been recently analysed from diﬀerent perspectives. On the one
hand research has examined the eﬀect on career opportunities of labour market entry via atypical
jobs: the job shopping hypotheses as opposed to the port of entry one (see Booth, Francesconi
and Frank (2000); Guell-Rotllan and Petrongolo (2000); Santacroce (2000) ). On the other hand
economists have tried to understand the impact of the widespread use of temporary contracts on the
unemployment rate and labour market performance (see Blanchard and Landier (2001); Veracierto
(2000); Van Ours (2000) ; Adam and Canziani (1998); Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (1999); Saint-Paul,
(1996) ).
In this paper we analyse the eﬀects of employment regulations on employment levels, dis-
tinguishing between permanent and temporary employment. Our question, both theoretical and
empirical, is whether the labour market reforms of the last decades have diﬀerently aﬀected these
two categories of employees. In other words we want to see if recent institutional changes have
aﬀected total employment, its composition between permanent and temporary workers, or both.
We consider, at a theoretical level, several forms of employment regulations: the level of ﬁring
costs, the cost of hiring temporary labour (aﬀected by the eﬃciency of public placement services and
by the regulation of interim agencies), and the existence of quota constraints on the employment
of temporary workers.
Our model assumes that the economy might be in a good or in a bad state. An exogenous
probability of transition between the two states and the existence of ﬁring costs leads ﬁrms to
choose the optimal composition of temporary and permanent employees. These two categories
of contracts are characterised by a diﬀerent productivity level, which is assumed to be lower for
temporary employees given their lack of ﬁrm speciﬁc skills and the need to train them. The relative
cost of the two labour inputs is determined by ﬁring costs, which do not aﬀect temporary workers,
and by the hiring framework. Finally, there exists an high but imperfect degree of substitution
between the two categories of workers.
The main ﬁndings of the theoretical model are anticipated here. A decrease in the relative cost
of temporary workers (due to a lower relative wage or to a more eﬃcient placement mechanism)
raises temporary employment but reduces permanent employment. The eﬀects on total employment
are generally ambiguous unless the constraint on temporary contracts is binding. In this case we
1This choice could be well explained by the fact that the insiders pool usually represents the majority of voters in
democratic systems (Saint-Paul (1998); Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (1999))
3observe a rise in total employment. A decrease in ﬁring costs has opposite eﬀects in good and bad
states: in good states temporary employment rises and permanent employment falls, vice versa in
bad states.
When the constraint on temporary contracts is binding, higher hiring costs reduce employment
for both employment types in both states, whereas higher ﬁring costs reduce both employment
types in good states. If the constraint on temporary employment is relaxed, the positive eﬀects on
temporary employment are accompanied by negative eﬀects on permanent one. The net impact on
total employment is however positive in good states and negative in bad ones. Hence, employment
regulations are not independent of one another. For instance, ﬁring costs have diﬀerent eﬀects on
employment according to the existence of constraints on the use of temporary workers.
The ambiguity of some of the analytical predictions of the model, suggests that the ultimate
determination of the impact of these labour market institutions on employment types has to be
empirical.
We test the implications of the model by means of a ﬁxed eﬀect GLS estimation using an unbal-
anced sample of nine European countries, observed from 1983 to 1995, using a set of institutional
indicators provided by OECD and other researchers (see appendix C1-C3). In general, the conclu-
sions of the model are reﬂected in our estimations and we are also able to shed some light on all
cases for which it is not possible to derive an unambiguous analytical result. All estimates are also
robust and coherent with previous empirical ﬁndings in the literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows: the theoretical model is presented in section two,
while the third section presents the empirical analysis. The last section contains some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Our objective in this section is to conduct a theoretical evaluation of the impact of diﬀerent em-
ployment regulations on employment levels. We present a theoretical model that contains diﬀerent
sources of labour market rigidities. These are:
• ﬁring costs: a ﬁrm that ﬁres some of its permanent workers has to make severance payments;
• entry wages: a ﬁrm that hires a worker on a temporary basis pays him/her a wage lower
than that paid to a permanent employee; this diﬀerential is the compensation for the training
provided by the ﬁrm;
• hiring costs: these depend on the eﬃciency of the public placement system and on the exis-
tence of temporary work agencies;
• constraints on the use of temporary contracts: a ﬁrm is not allowed to maintain more than a
given percentage of its workforce on temporary contracts.
In what follows, we evaluate the eﬀects of changes in these institutional dimensions on permanent
as well as temporary employment.
The ﬁrst paragraph describes the optimal behaviour of ﬁrms, and introduces an explicit form
for the total revenue function whose argument are permanent and temporary workers. The second
paragraph analyses the eﬀects of a reduction in ﬁring costs, hiring costs and entry wages on the
employment level. The third paragraph considers the eﬀects of the constraints on temporary
contracts usage. The fourth paragraph presents a synthesis of the main theoretical results.
42.1 The Behaviour of the Firm
We consider an economy with a homogeneous labour force and a given number of ﬁrms. This
economy is hit by a productivity shock2, Z, which assumes two values: ZG and ZB,w i t hZG >Z B.
We label these two states of the world as good and bad. The productivity shock is supposed to
follow a Markov chain (as in Bertola and Ichino (1995) ), where p is the probability of transition
from one state to the other. This means that when the ﬁrm is in a good state at time t with
Zt = ZG, we have E(Zt+1)=( 1− p)ZG + pZB,w h e r eE is the expectation operator. Vice versa,
when Zt = ZB we have E(Zt+1)=( 1−p)ZB +pZG. Assuming the shocks are idiosyncratic to each
ﬁrm it follows that, at every instant t, half of ﬁrms are in each of the two states.
We suppose that ﬁrms always hire workers on short term contracts, thereby incurring hiring
costs. On expiry of each contract, ﬁrms may hire the worker on a permanent contract or they may
conclude the contract without costs. It is not possible to renew temporary contracts. On the other
hand, when a ﬁrm wants to break oﬀ a permanent contract, it must pay a ﬁring cost (F).
Firms must choose the optimal number of short term and permanent contracts in each of the
two states of the economy. The decision concerning short term contracts is straightforward: given
n as the number of temporary workers and N as that of permanent ones, with ZR(n,N)a st h e
total revenue3, the usual static condition of equality between marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts
deﬁnes the optimal stock of short term contracts in each of the two states:
ZsR 
n(ns,N s)=ws + Hf o r s = G,B (1)
where w is the unit labour cost for a temporary contract (it include wages plus all taxes and
contribution on labour), H is the unitary hiring costs, and the index s represents the two states.
As regards long term contracts, each ﬁrm maximises the expected current discounted value of
future cash ﬂows. When hit by a negative shock, it will ﬁre workers until the expected negative
value of a job is equal to the ﬁring cost:
−F = ZBR 




where W is the cost of each permanent worker (the wage rate plus taxes and contributions), J is
the intertemporal value of the job, and r is the discount rate of future cash ﬂows. In the following
period the ﬁrm will be in the bad state (where the value of the job will be −F), with probability
1 − p , and in the good state (where the value of the job will be zero, as we will see below), with
probability p, so that: E(Jt+1)=−(1 − p)F.
Each ﬁrm that has experienced a positive shock will hire workers until their expected marginal
revenue is zero:
0=ZGR 




In this case, the expected value of a job is E(Jt+1)=−pF.












2As will be clariﬁed later, the parameter Z may as well be considered a demand shock.








N ≤ 0; R(0,0) = 0
5The intuition behind these results is that the existence of ﬁring costs reduces labour costs in bad
states and raises them in good states.
In order to derive analytical expressions for the level of temporary and permanent employment
in both states of the world, we must assume an analytical speciﬁcation for the total revenue function.
In other words, we must make assumptions about the productivity of each worker type and about
the degree of substitution between them.
A short term employee has no experience of the ﬁrm, whereas a permanent employee does. It
is reasonable to assume that the former has a lower productivity level than the latter4. Regard-
ing the degree of substitution between the two categories of workers, the few papers that have
analysed this problem5 assume a constant marginal rate of substitution, i.e. an inﬁnite elasticity
of substitution. In our model we prefer to suppose that, although the two categories of workers
are close substitutes, they are not perfect ones. The basis of this assumption is the temporary
employee’s need for workplace training. The productivity of a temporary worker under training
will depend on the number of experienced workers that can help him/her to acquire ﬁrm speciﬁc
knowledge and skills. Therefore the productivity level of a temporary employee will depend on the
ratio between permanent workers (those with knowledge of ﬁrm’s technological characteristics) and
the temporary ones.
Summarising the above, we assume:
(i) lower productivity of temporary workers with respect to permanent ones’;
(ii) a positive relation between the productivity of temporary workers and the ratio of permanent
to temporary workers;
(iii) a degree of substitution between the two categories of employees that is much greater than
one.
These assumptions suggest the CES speciﬁcation as a natural candidate for the production
function in the model6.
Let us suppose an imperfect competitive product market, in which y = p−η,w h e r ey is product
demand, p product prices and η the elasticity of demand. Total revenue R i sg i v e nb y:R = y
1− 1
η.
If we set γ ≡ 1 − 1
η, we have R = yγ. Hence, assuming a CES speciﬁcation for y, we can write:
R(ns,N s)=Zs [anρ
s +( 1− a)Nρ
s]
γ
ρ for s= G,B (6)
where ρ = σ−1
σ with σ   1 the elasticity of substitution between the two categories of workers7
and a<1
2.
4This is a standard assumption in the literature. See Blanchard and Landier (2001) and Arulampalam and Booth
(1998) for a discussion of this point.
5See Saint Paul (1996).
6This is the same speciﬁcation used by Cappariello (2000). The drawback to the CES function is that when
the number of temporary workers tends to zero, the marginal rate of substitution is greater than one, as if each
temporary worker could be replaced by more than one permanent worker. Our results are therefore less reliable when
the number of temporary employees is almost zero. This is however a marginal case given the object of the analysis.
7It should now be clear that Zs can be equally interpreted as a productivity shock or a demand shock. In fact,





, obtaining the same results of equation 6.
62.2 The Employment Level
We can summarise equations 4 and 5 by writing:
ZsR 
Ns(ns,N s)=Ws + xsFf o r s = G,B (7)
where xs = xB = −
r+p
1+r < 0 if we are in the bad states and xs = xG =
p
1+r > 0 if we are in the
good ones.
In order to simplify the analysis, we suppose the temporary workers’wage, w, hiring costs H
and ﬁring costs F to be a proportion of permanent workers’wage W. Analytically, we assume
that ws + H = µWs and Fs = φWs. This implies that a reduction in µ describes a more eﬃcient
placement system or a reduction in the entry wage, while a lower φ indicates greater ﬂexibility in
employment protection legislation.
In order to determine the optimal level of employment we must calculate the marginal revenues
of the two labour factors from equation 6 (R 
Ns(Ns,n s) and R 
ns(Ns,n s)) and substitute them in





s +( 1− a)N
ρ
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s +( 1− a)N
ρ
s
anρ−1 = µWf o r s = G,B
Combining these two conditions, we easily determine the ratio of short term to permanent
contracts (λs = ns
Ns for s= G,B) as a function of the ratio of their relative cost (Xs(µ,φ )), and















for s= G,B (9)
with A = 1−a
a and dXG
dφ > 0, dXB
dφ < 0, dXs
dµ < 0 ∀s.
Given that XG >X B, the ratio of temporary to permanent employment is, as expected, higher
in good states.






























The two equations are composed of a ﬁrst element which is traditional in the sense that it shows
a negative relationship between employment and the wage and a positive relationship between
employment, productivity and the shock level. The second element describes the eﬀect of the costs
of both factors on each input.
7We may now calculate the eﬀect of ﬁring costs (φ) and the relative cost of temporary workers
(µ) on permanent and temporary employment levels in both states of the economy, deﬁned in
equations 10 and 11. These results depend on the diﬀerence between ρ and γ. Our theoretical
framework implies8 that ρ>γ . Therefore, it follows that:
Remark 1 An increase in ﬁring costs induces temporary employment to increase in good states and
to decrease in bad states. Permanent employment is reduced in good states, whereas it is increased
in bad states. It follows that the ratio of temporary to permanent employment is increased in good
states and is decreased in bad states.











where the ﬁrst two derivatives on the RHS are positive and the third is positive in the good state
and negative in the bad one. Hence we have dnB
dφ < 0 and dnG














where the ﬁrst addend on the RHS is negative in the good state and positive in the bad one; the
second addend is composed by a ﬁrst term that is negative, a second term that is positive and a




Furthermore we ﬁnd, perhaps not surprisingly, that :
Remark 2 When the relative cost of temporary employment with respect to permanent employment
is increased, temporary employment falls in both states of the world while permanent employment
rises.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating equations 10 and 11 with respect to µ, considering that ∂Xs














< 0 for s= B,G











> 0 for s= B,G
where the ﬁrst and third partial derivatives are negative, and the second positive.
Although the sign of these derivatives is well deﬁned, the relationship between ﬁrm’s total
employment Ls = Ns + ns and the above parameters is not. In fact, given that permanent and
temporary employment always move in opposite directions, the sign of the relationship between total
employment, ﬁring costs and the relative cost of temporary contracts depends on all parameters
of the model and is ambiguous. As a consequence, the eﬀect of employment regulations on the
8ρ>γimplies: 1 −
1
σ > 1 −
1
η,w h e r eσ is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers and
η the absolute value of product demand elasticity. This implies σ>η . If the product market is characterized by a
certain degree of monopolistic power the condition is respected, since we supposed a strong substitution between the
two categories of workers.
8aggregate employment level at each moment in time is also ambiguous. The same result of ambiguity
applies to the relationship between employment protection and average permanent and temporary
employment, equal respectively to N = NG+NB
2 and n = nG+nB
2 .
Because we consider two diﬀerent categories of workers, instead of the permanent one alone, we
obtain a diﬀerent result from that generated by traditional models of employment determination
with turnover costs (see Bentolila and Bertola (1990) ). Regarding permanent employment, we
derive similar conclusions to those resulting from these models: higher ﬁring costs reduce the
variability of permanent employment and they may reduce or raise the average employment level.
However, our model predicts that the number of temporary contracts will increase with adjustment
costs in good states and decrease in bad states. Hence, our theoretical framework does not imply
that higher ﬂexibility increases total employment variability.
2.3 The Regulation of Temporary Contracts
In the previous section we deﬁned the analytical expressions for the optimal values of employment
in good and bad states. In this section we assume that temporary contracts are regulated by speciﬁc
rules. In fact, we suppose that there exists a limit, ﬁxed by employment regulation legislation, on
the use of short-time employment. This limit is measured by a threshold λ on the ratio of temporary
contracts to permanent ones λ.









From this relation we can calculate the marginal revenue of permanent workers and equalize it to
their marginal cost9, obtaining respectively the ”constrained” permanent employment level:   Ns:





















the ”constrained” temporary employment level   ns:
  ns = λ   Ns ; (14)
and the ”constrained” total employment   Ls:
  Ls =( 1+λ)   Ns . (15)
The above equations imply that:
Remark 3 If the constraint on temporary employment is binding, lower ﬁring costs will raise both
permanent and temporary employment in good states. On the other hand, employment will be
reduced in bad states.
9The total cost is deﬁned by TC s = Ws(1 + xsφ)Ns +( ws + H)ns,w i t hws + H = µsWs and, given that the
constraint is binding, ns = λNs. Diﬀerentiating with respect to Ns, we obtain that the marginal cost of labour is
MCs =( 1+xsφ + µλ)Ws =( Xs + λ)µWs .
9Proof. In good states we have that dX
dφ > 0, whereas in bad states dX
dφ < 0 (from equation 9)).
Given that both permanent and temporary employment are decreasing in Xs (see equations 13 and



















Remark 4 If the constraint on temporary employment is binding, a reduction in the relative cost
of temporary workers raises both permanent and temporary employment in both states.
Proof. Given equation 9, we can write the denominator of equation 13 as: Ws[(1+xsφ)+(λµ)].
Hence, it follows that d Ns
dµ < 0 and, from equation 14, d ns
dµ < 0.
If the constraint on short-term contracts is binding, a reduction in the cost of temporary employ-
ees will increase both kinds of employment in both states of the world. A reduction in ﬁring costs
will increase both temporary and permanent employment in good states whereas it will decrease
them in bad states.
Let us now analyse the employment eﬀects of a reduction in the constraints on temporary
labour. The main results may be summarized as follows.
Remark 5 When the constraints on temporary contracts are relaxed, temporary employment in-
creases in both states of the world and permanent employment decreases in both states of the world
(unless the constraint λ is set at a very unrealistic low level). Total employment usually grows but,
depending on the relative cost of temporary workers, it may decrease when the binding constraint
is set at an high level, near the one that the ﬁrm would have chosen in a free market.
Proof. See appendix A.
Consequently, a liberalisation of temporary employment tends to raise total employment, but
if it is exceeding a certain threshold and if temporary workers cost more than permanent ones, it
may reduce total employment.
This conclusion implies that a total employment maximizing constraint on temporary labour
may exist. Furthermore, given that the relative cost of temporary workers is higher in bad states
(so that XB <X G), the reduction in total employment is more likely to happen in bad states of
the economy.
2.4 A Synthesis
More ﬂexible labour markets can mean many things. We analyse the employment eﬀects of:
• an increase in the relative cost of temporary workers with respect to permanent ones (µ);
this can be obtained both through a reduction in entry wages and greater eﬃciency of the
placement system;
• an increase in severance payments (φ);
• a liberalisation of temporary contracts (λ).
10The main results of our theoretical analysis are presented in Table 1, where we summarize the
sign of derivatives of variables, listed by row, with respect to parameters, listed by column10.W e
distinguish the cases in which the limit on temporary contracts usage is not binding (columns, a
and c) from the case in which this limit is stringent (columns b and d).
Variation of: Temporary Firing costs Constraints
workers cost on
λs < λ λs > λ λs < λ λs > λ temporary
Contracts
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Eﬀects on: dµ> 0 dµ>0 dφ > 0 dφ > 0 dλ>0
NG + - - - -
NB + - + + -
nG - - + - +
nB - - - + +
LG ?- - ?- - ?+
LB ?- - ?+ + ?+
λG - + +
λB - - +
Where (?+) indicates that the sign of the derivative is not analitically
determined but it is positive for realistic parameters values.
Table 1: Employment eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of labour market ﬂexibility
Let us look at the eﬀects of an increase in the cost of temporary workers when the constraints
on the use of temporary labour is not binding (column a). When the relative temporary labour
cost is higher, permanent employment increases while temporary employment decreases. Not sur-
prisingly, the optimal share of temporary contracts λ also decreases. The sign of the change in
total employment (Ls) is ambiguous and depends on all the parameters in the model.
If the constraint on temporary contracts is binding (column b), an increase in the cost of
temporary workers reduces both types of employment in both states.
An increase in ﬁring costs when the constraint is not binding (column c) induces a reduction
(rise) in permanent employment in good (bad) states and temporary employment in bad (good)
states. The optimal share of temporary employment is positively correlated with ﬁring costs in
good states. Again, the sign of the variation in total employment is ambiguous.
If the constraint is binding (column d), a reduction of ﬁring costs raises both types of employ-
ment in good states.
When the regulations on temporary contracts are relaxed (column e) permanent employment
is likely to decrease in good states where the eﬀects on temporary workers are always positive. For
what concerns total employment, a negative eﬀect is likely to prevail, at least in bad states.
How well does our model explain the eﬀect of the institutional evolution of European labour
markets in recent decades? To what extent can the dynamics of temporary and permanent employ-
ment be imputed to changes in short term contract regulations and the legal protection of insiders?
Can empirical analysis tell us more about the cases for which our model has ambiguous results?
The next section seeks to answer these questions. The ﬁrst two parts concentrate on a descriptive
10Note that the results of columns 2 and 4 are valid under the hypothesis of a degree of substitution between
temporary and permanent workers higher that the elasticity of product demand. Given the assumptions of our
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Figure 1: The percentage of temporary employment over working age population in Europe (dif-
ferent categories): 1983-1999
account of the ﬁgures on temporary work and regulations in Europe. The third part presents our
estimation results. The last part deals with speciﬁcation and diagnostic testing.
3 The Empirical Analysis
3.1 Some Figures on Temporary Work in Europe
The temporary content of actual employment has risen in the twelve major European countries11
from around 7.5% in 1985 to 10.5% in 1990, to almost 13% in 1999 (source: Eurostat). This means
that the ratio has almost doubled in the last ﬁfteen years. In other words temporary employment
increased rapidly in the second half of the eighties and it remained stable until the mid nineties,
when it started to grow again.
If we take a closer look at the situation of each country in the sample12 we ﬁnd that the
temporary employment patterns are not homogeneous across Europe. Figure 1 shows the time
pattern of temporary employment over working age population for each country from 1983 to 1999,
calculated over diﬀerent categories of employees. It is quite clear that temporary employment is
proportionally higher among young workers in all countries, while the diﬀerence between males
and females does not appear to be marked except perhaps for Spain and the UK. The actual
proportion of temporary employees is diverse across Europe. Countries such as Denmark, Germany,
Netherlands and Spain are characterised by a higher temporary employment population ratio, with
11We consider West Germany only.
12We concentrate here on the nine major European countries, for which long series on temporary and permanent
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Figure 2: Voluntarity of temporary work in Europe: percentage of voluntary and involuntary tem-
porary employees
an average magnitude of around 1/5 of the total workforce. By contrast, Ireland, Italy and the
UK display a much lower percentage of temporary employment, although it has increased in recent
years. Finally, countries as Belgium and France can be considered as intermediate between the two
groups deﬁned above.
As to the reasons for undertaking temporary employment, Figure 2 shows the percentage of
Eurostat Labour Force Survey respondents that cited either training contents, a probationary
period, the impossibility of ﬁnding a permanent job or unwillingness to do so, as the main reason
for entering a temporary job. The ﬁgure shows clearly that in most of the countries the majority
of temporary contracts have been accepted because of the impossibility of ﬁnding a permanent job.
In three countries, however, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK, the 1999 ﬁgures on voluntary and
involuntary temporary employee percentages are of the same magnitude. This could indicate a
shift in employees’preferences against permanent forms of employment, especially in the ﬁrst two
countries. Spain has an overwhelming majority of temporary employees unable to ﬁnd permanent
jobs, while the training content of temporary work is particularly important in Germany, Italy
and Denmark. Nothing can be said about France, where the percentage of non respondents to the
question is particularly high.
3.2 The Institutional Characteristics of Employment Regulations
We concentrate on three types of employment regulations. The ﬁrst is employment protection
legislation (EP) which governs the procedures for ﬁring permanent employees. In other words,
these rules determine the level of what was called ﬁring costs φ in our theoretical model. The
second form is represented by ﬁxed term contract regulations (FTC). These are the rules that
govern the hiring of temporary labour for a ﬁxed term stated by law. On expiry of the term, the
13ﬁrm decides whether the employee stays within the ﬁrm or leaves. The last type is represented
by temporary work agencies regulations (TWA). This form of legislation governs the hiring of
temporary employees, usually employed on speciﬁc and time limited operations, from the agencies’
placing system. It is worth noting that both FTC and TWA contribute to determine the cost
of temporary employees µ in our model. However, distinguishing between the two dimensions
proves useful at an empirical level in order to obtain a clearer picture of the employment impact
of temporary labour regulations. We may consider the constraint on temporary contracts ¯ λ as an
approximation of the role played by FTC.
A set of institutional indicators on the various dimensions of employment regulations have been
made available by OECD and other researchers. Table 2 summarizes the values of these indicators
for the nine European countries included in our sample. The indicators for FTC and TW are
provided by Belot and van Ours (2000), except for the values for Spain, which were constructed by
the authors using the same criteria. The indicator for EP is constructed using the series provided
by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and OECD (1994, 1999)13. Increasing values of each indicator
indicate stricter regulations. All indicators have been normalized in order to have the same range
{0,3}.
The table shows some selected indicator values for each country calculated at ﬁxed intervals from
1983 to 1995 and the change in regulations over each period. It results clear that in recent decades
there has been a general tendency towards the relaxation of the constraints on the three dimensions
of employment regulation in Europe. However the picture is still diﬀerentiated, with some countries
exhibiting marked rigidities in employment regulations and other countries characterised by high
levels of ﬂexibility.
Table 3 shows the percentage changes in summary statistics of the institutional indicators in
Europe over the period 1983-1995. Fixed term contracts and temporary work agencies regulations
have been characterised by a ﬂexibilization process of the same magnitude, as can be seen from the
changes in indicators’means. However the standard deviation of ﬁxed term contract regulations has
increased due to legislation changes in opposite directions in some countries, while the homogeneity
of temporary work agency regulations has remained stable. Insiders protection has also decreased
in Europe, showing a slow process of convergence on more ﬂexible levels.
To summarise what has just been said about short term employment and regulations, in recent
decades Europe has undergone a process of institutional change that has had a signiﬁcant impact
on the composition of European employment. The result is that the percentage of temporary
employment has risen signiﬁcantly. Are these changes set to constitute the future scenario for
European employment? More importantly, have these institutional reforms been beneﬁcial for
European labour markets, or have they merely increased the percentage of insecure jobs? Needed
to supplement these merely descriptive ﬁgures is a more sophisticated analysis that attempts to
answer these questions. This is the subject of next section.
3.3 A Fixed Eﬀect Estimate of the Impact of Employment Regulations on Tem-
porary Work in Europe
The aim of this section is to investigate the role played by labour market institutions in shaping
the ﬁgures of permanent and temporary employment in Europe in recent decades. We consider
an unbalanced panel of nine European countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom, observed at most from 1983 to 1995. The
data on temporary and permanent employment are provided by Eurostat Labour Force Survey,
13A full description of the criteria used to construct each indicator is provided in Appendixes B and C.
14Country Year FTCa,d ∆FTC TWAb,d ∆TWA EPc,d ∆EP
Belgium 83 2.4 . 2 . 2.32 .
87 1.8 -0.6 2 0 2.32 0
91 1.8 0 2 0 2.06 -0.27
95 1.05 -0.75 2 0 1.79 -0.27 -
Denmark 83 0 . 2 . 1.65 .
87 0 0 2 0 1.65 0
91 0 0 0 -2 1.38 -0.27
95 0 0 0 0 1.11 -0.27
France 83 2.4 . 1.5 . 1.95 .
87 0.6 -1.8 0.5 -1 1.95
91 1.5 0.9 1.5 1 2.1 0.15
95 1.5 0 1.5 0 2.25 0.15
Germany 83 3 . 1.5 . 2.47 .
87 1.95 -1.05 1.38 -0.12 2.47 0
91 1.8 -0.15 1.38 0 2.3 -0.18
95 1.65 -0.15 1.38 0 2.12 -0.18
Ireland 83 0 . 0 . 0.75 .
87 0 0 0 0 0.75 0
91 0 0 0 0 0.78 0.03
95 0 0 0 0 0.81 0.03
Italy 83 2.4 . 3 . 3 .
87 1.65 -0.75 3 0 3 0
91 1.65 0 3 0 2.88 -0.12
95 1.65 0 3 0 2.67 -0.21
Netherl. 83 0.6 . 1.5 . 2.03 .
87 0.6 0 1.38 -0.12 2.03 0
91 0.6 0 1.38 0 1.93 -0.09
95 0.45 -0.15 1.38 0 1.85 -0.09
Spain 83 0.6 . 3 . 2.85 .
87 0.6 0 3 0 2.85 0
91 0.6 0 3 0 2.64 -0.21
95 1.8 1.2 1.5 -1.5 2.43 -0.21
U. K. 83 0.6 . 0.13 . 0.52 .
87 0.6 0 0.13 0 0.52 0
91 0.6 0 0.13 0 0.52 0
95 0.6 0 0.13 0 0.52 0
aFTC: index of strictness in Fixed Term Contracts regulation {0-3}, original data
from Belot and van Ours (2000) updated for Spain by the authors.
bWTA: index of strictness in Temporary Work Agencies regulation {0-3}, original
data from Belot and van Ours (2000).
cEP: index of strictness in Firing Costs {0-3}, original data from Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) and OECD (1994, 1999).
dIncreasing values indicate stricter regulations.
Table 2: The regulation of ﬁxed term contracts, temporary work agencies and employment protec-
tion in Europe: 1983-1995
15FTC TWA EP
Percentage change in standard deviation +39% −5% −13%
Percentage change in mean −28% −26% −11%
Table 3: Employment regulation in Europe: percentage changes in summary statistics over the
period 1983-1995
while the data on institutions are those described above, plus a set of additional indicators provided
by Nickell and Nunziata (2001).
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the theoretical model depicted above, which can


















Temporary employment is increasing in the shock level, the threshold on the ratio of temporary
to permanent contracts, and the product between the shock and ﬁring costs. It is decreasing in
the cost of labour, the relative cost of temporary employment, hiring and ﬁring costs and the
interaction between the shock and the threshold ¯ λ.


















Permanent employment is increasing in the shock level, the relative cost of temporary em-
ployment, ﬁring costs, and the product between hiring costs and temporary workers adoption. It
is decreasing in the cost of labour (and therefore in wage pressure variables), hiring costs, the
constraint on temporary labour usage, and the interaction between the shock level and ﬁring costs.
Our econometric speciﬁcation follows the framework suggested by Nickell et al. (2001) and
Nunziata (2001), i.e. we include the regressors suggested by the theoretical model as well as a set
of controls for wage pressure institutions. These are the tax wedge, the degree of coordination in
wage bargaining, union density, and unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate and duration14.
Rewriting equations 16 and 17 in linear form, allowing for a partial adjustment speciﬁcation,
we obtain the following model:
yit = β0 + β1yit−1 + γ
1z1 + γ
2z2 + λh + θx + φiti + µi + vt + εit (18)
where yit = nit,N it is the employment population ratio, (temporary or permanent), z1 is a
vector of employment regulating institutions z2 is a vector of wage pressure institutions, h is a
vector of interactions among institutions, x is a vector of controls for macroeconomic shocks, ti is a
country speciﬁc time trend, µi is a ﬁxed country eﬀect, vt is a year dummy, and εit is the stochastic
error.
The vector of employment regulations is composed of the three dimensions discussed above:
γ
1z1 = γ1FTCit + γ2TWAit + γ3EPit (19)
where FTCit is ﬁxed term contract legislation, TWAit is temporary work agencies regulation
and EPit is permanent employment protection. The vector of wage pressure institutions contains
14For a full description of each institution, with deﬁnitions, construction methods and data sources see Nickell et
al. (2001) and Nickell and Nunziata (2001) .
16a set of regulations assumed to aﬀect the employment population ratio through labour market
adjustments15. These are the unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate BRRit , the unemployment
beneﬁt duration BDit, the net union density UDit , the level of bargaining coordination COit and
the tax wedge TWit . Moreover, we include a set of interactions among institutions to take account
of possible complementarity eﬀects and to allow for heterogeneity of coeﬃcients across countries.
The vector of institutional interactions takes the following form (with obvious notation):
λh = λ1EPCOit + λ2BRRBDit + λ3UDCOit + λ4TWCOit (20)
where each interaction is calculated as the product of deviations from each variable’s world
average, in order to read the coeﬃcient of each institution in level as the coeﬃcient of the average
country. Finally, the vector of macroeconomic shock controls contains the following elements:
θx = θ1LDSit + θ2TFPSit + θ3AMSit + θ4RIRLit + θ5TTSit (21)
where LDSit is a labour demand shock, TFPSit is a total factor productivity shock, AMSit is
a money supply shock, RIRLit is long term interest rate, and TTSit a terms of trade shock.
The deﬁnition of each mean zero shock is the following: the labour demand shock consists of
the residuals of the labour demand model estimated by Nickell and Nunziata (2000)16; the total
factor productivity shock is the HP cyclical component of TFP calculated for each country; the
money supply shock is the acceleration in money supply; and the term of trade shock is deﬁned
as (impit/GDPit)∆ln(pimp/pGDP)it,w h e r eimp is the level of nominal imports, GDP is GDP at
market prices, pimp is the imports deﬂator and pGDP is the GDP deﬂator.
Following the theoretical implications of our model, the estimation analysis is constructed on
the assumption that equilibrium employment population ratios depend on the institutional conﬁg-
uration of the labour market, where this relationship is also subject to macroeconomic conditions
represented by the shocks. We are particularly interested in the impact of ﬁxed term contracts, tem-
porary work agencies regulation and permanent employment protection legislation on permament
and temporary employment population ratios.
In this section we present the results of our empirical analysis, while the next section is more
technical and contains a detailed account of diagnostic and speciﬁcation tests. Tables 4, 5 and
6 present some estimation results using a ﬁxed eﬀect GLS estimator, correcting for by country
heteroskedasticity and country speciﬁc ﬁrst order autoregressive serial correlation. Each table
presents the estimation results of the same six models applied to diﬀerent data, i.e. employment
population ratios calculated over diﬀerent age and gender categories. Table 4 deals with total
employment, Table 5 with female employment, and Table 6 with employees aged 15 to 24. The
characteristics of each model are the following:
• Model A: permanent employment population ratio (EPOPperm) equation;
• Model B: temporary employment population ratio (EPOPtemp) equation;
• Model C: temporary - permanent employment ratio (λ) equation;
15For a more detailed account of the role played by wage pressure institutions, see Nickell et al. (2001) and Nunziata
(2001).
16There are at least two other ways of dealing with the labour demand shock. An alternative measure is represented
by the residuals of the by country regressions of employment on its three lags, log real wage and log real output.
Another strategy is to use the ratio of temporary (permanent) employment to the total as dependent variable, in order
to control for shocks in labour demand. In both cases, the regression output using these alternative methodologies
does not show any appreciable divergence from what is reported in this paper.
17• Model D: total (temporary + permanent) employment population ratio (EPOP) equation;
• Model E: EPOPperm equation including interactions with state dummy;
• Model F: EPOPtemp equation including interactions with state dummy;
• Model G: EPOP equation including interactions with state dummy.
Models A and B are therefore the simple estimations of equation 18 for the two cases of perma-
nent and temporary employment. Model C is a regression of the ratio λ of the two workers types,
while Model D estimates the eﬀects of institutions on total employment population ratio, where
EPOP = EPOPperm+ EPOPtemp. Finally Model E, F and G are modiﬁcations of A, B and
D respectively, where a dummy variable equal to 1 in contraction periods is interacted with the
three employment regulation regressors in order to test the asymmetric implications of the model
for good and bad states of the economy17.
3.3.1 Table 4: Total (M+F) Employment Population Ratios
Table 4 sets out the estimation results calculated for permanent and temporary employment over
all age and gender categories. As regards the eﬀect of employment protection EP (ﬁring costs in
section two) on permanent employment, it will be recalled that our model predicts that stricter
regulations have a negative impact in good states and a positive impact in bad states (columns (c)
and (d) of Table 1). The eﬀect on permanent employment when averaged across states is therefore
an empirical matter. Model 4.A shows clearly that stricter insider employment protection EP
(ﬁring costs in the model) has a highly signiﬁcant positive impact on permanent employment. It
seems, therefore, that the gain in EPOPperm generated by more costly dismissals predominates
over the disincentive in hirings. Regarding the eﬀect on temporary employment, the estimates
conﬁrm an eﬀect of opposite sign, as predicted by the theoretical model. Moreover, we are again
able to discriminate between the alternative theoretical scenarios depicted in Table 1, obtaining a
signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient of EP in the temporary employment equation.
These two results combined are reﬂected by the signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of stricter EP on
λ: an increase in the protection of insiders will increase permanent employment while reducing
temporary employment.
A very interesting result concerns the impact of ﬁxed term contracts and temporary work
agencies regulation. As we can see from the table, FTC has a weak eﬀect on EPOPtemp, while
TWA has a signiﬁcant impact of expected sign on both EPOPperm and EPOPtemp.T h i s
means that an increase in the strictness of temporary work agencies regulations reduces temporary
employment while increasing permanent employment. This is a clear substitution eﬀect, with ﬁrms
adopting more permanent labour when the agencies’placement system is more strictly regulated.
Regarding the net eﬀect of employment regulations on total employment (EPOP), it will be
seen from column 4.D that there are weak signs of signiﬁcance of FTC and EP, with respectively
negative and positive coeﬃcients (the P − value is 0.14 in both cases). One notes, however, that
the eﬀect of EP on EPOP is reinforced when bargaining coordination is high, as indicated by the
coeﬃcient of the interaction term.
A useful exercise is to introduce interactions of the contraction dummy with the employment
regulation regressors, in order to test for asymmetric eﬀects in good and bad states of the economy.
17This dummy variable is calculated as equal to 1 when the by country cyclical component of Hodrick - Prescott
ﬁltered real GDP is lower than zero. It is zero otherwise. The ﬁltration of the GDP data has been performed on
country annual series from 1960 to 1995.
18Following this procedure, the coeﬃcient of each variable gives us the impact of the institution in
good states only. The diﬀerence between the institution’s coeﬃcient and the interaction’s coeﬃcient
instead provides the eﬀect in bad states. Column 4.E yields insights into the way FTC constrains
the adoption of temporary labour. The negative impact of FTC on temporary employment is
actually only present in good states, with its coeﬃcient almost equal to zero in bad states. This
could explain the weak eﬀect of FTC in columns 4.B and 4.D, and it provides useful insights into
how ﬁxed term contracts regulation works.
As regards TWA,the variable is not signiﬁcant in the EPOP model of Column 4.D. However,
when the interaction of the state dummy is introduced, in columns 4.E, 4.F and 4.G, it becomes
signiﬁcant with expected sign in bad states. This result seems to indicate an asymmetric eﬀect of
TWA, with stricter regulations having a detrimental eﬀect on temporary employment mainly in
bad states.
If we combine the impact of FTC and TWA, we ﬁnd that the predictions of the model in
column (a) of Table 1 are conﬁrmed. The interesting aspect is that FTC is signiﬁcant in shaping
the cost of temporary work in good states, while TWA is relevant in bad states. This could be
related to the fact that when ﬁrms hire temporary labour they prefer to use ﬁxed term contracts
in good states when the business perspective is better, while in bad states, when the conversion of
temporary employees into permanent ones is less likely to occur, they prefer agencies. Fixed term
contracts in this sense could be considered a superior form of temporary employment, embedding
higher chances of switching into a permanent contract and therefore preferred by ﬁrms during
expansions. This implies that a strict regulation of ﬁxed term contracts is only eﬀective in good
states, when ﬁrms’hirings are at their peak, while bad states are characterised by lower hiring rates,
so that FTC is not relevant in shaping employment population ratios18. Both kinds of regulations
have a signiﬁcant negative impact on EPOPtemp as well as on EPOP, with no particular eﬀect on
permanent employment. This ﬁnding therefore suggests that greater ﬂexibility in temporary work
agencies regulations tends to increase total employment during contractions, and higher ﬂexibility
in ﬁxed term contracts tends to increase total employment during expansions, mainly through an
increase of temporary employment in the two states, leaving permanent employment unaﬀected.
Regarding the other institutional regressors, we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on beneﬁt replacement
ratios BRR. A negative coeﬃcient of beneﬁt duration BD is also present, with a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on temporary employment and total employment only. The eﬀect of the two beneﬁt variables is
reinforced by their interaction, which is signiﬁcant and negatively signed in the same columns as
BD. In other words, higher beneﬁt replacement rates induce a reduction in employment population
ratios, calculated for total, permanent and temporary employees, although the t-ratio is lower for
the latter category. Moreover, higher beneﬁt durations have a negative impact on total employment.
This eﬀect is greater the higher are the replacement rates, mainly through a reduction in temporary
employment.
The tax wedge TW and coordination in the bargaining process CO have a respectively negative
and positive signiﬁcant impact on permanent and total employment only. This result is in line
with what we would expect from these institutions. Coordination, in fact, mainly refers to the
bargaining of permanent employees’wages. The tax wedge variable also primarily relates to per-
manent employees, given that it is calculated using total employers’contributions, wages, salaries
and social security contributions, households’current receipts, and direct and indirect taxes.
Union density has an ambiguous impact on permanent and total employment, while we have
clear signs of union aversion against temporary employment, at least over the time span covered by
18Using the symbols of the theoretical model, this result could imply that λB < ¯ λ<λ G , i.e. that the constraint
on the adoption of temporary employees is only binding in good states.
19our data. The impact of coordination on temporary employment is present through the interaction
term UDCO, with higher coordination reducing union aversion towards temporary employment.
Concerning the controls for macroeconomic shocks, the labour demand and terms of trade shocks
have expected sign, but are signiﬁcant only in the EPOPperm and EPOP models. Regarding
TFPS, AMS and RIRL the evidence is that they are all insigniﬁcant.
These latter ﬁndings, from those regarding unemployment beneﬁts to those on macroeconomic
controls, are coherent with the results of other analyses that use the same methodology, such as
Nickell et al. (2001), where the same institutional data are used to estimate a set of regressions of
unemployment and total employment population ratio on a sample of 20 OECD countries, observed
from 1960 to 1995.
3.3.2 Table 5: Female Employment Population Ratios
If we compare Table 5 with Table 4 no substantial changes in the estimation results are appar-
ent. The estimates are in line with what shown by Figure 1, i.e. with the fact that temporary
employment population ratios display a similar pattern for total and female employees.
However, some comments are in order. Firstly, the eﬀect of insider regulations EP seems to be
more relevant with respect to Table 4. Stricter regulations are correlated with higher permanent fe-
male employment and lower temporary employment, with a positive net eﬀect on total employment.
The eﬀect of FTC and TWAis weaker, since there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on total employment. On
the other hand, we still have some detrimental eﬀects on temporary employment, with conﬁrmation
of the asymmetric impact of FTC and TWAin diﬀerent states of the economy.
It is interesting to note that union density has a signiﬁcant impact on permanent female em-
ployment and a still negative impact on temporary employment, with an ambiguous net eﬀect on
the total. Moreover, coordination shows some signs of signiﬁcance with a positive coeﬃcient on
temporary female employment as well, even if the eﬀect is present in column 5.F only. Another
striking result is that the labour demand shock is now signiﬁcant on both permanent and tempo-
rary employees, suggesting that, while temporary male employment may be uncorrelated with the
status of the labour market, female willingness to take up temporary jobs may instead be aﬀected
by it19. The money supply and total factor productivity shocks are now signiﬁcant. Money supply
acceleration has a positive impact on both permanent and total female employment, while TFP
acceleration has a negative impact on permanent employment. This latter results is surprising since
the acceleration in productivity should have a positive impact on employment in presence of sticky
wages. However, it may be the case that the acceleration in productivity mainly aﬀects prime age
males, with a negative substitution eﬀect on female employees.
3.3.3 Table 6: Young Employment Population Ratios
Table 6 presents the same seven models estimated on the employment population ratios of young
workers aged 15 to 24. These estimates are particularly interesting, because temporary employment
is concentrated mainly among young employees as shown by Figure 1.
To be noted ﬁrst is that the positive impact of employment protection on permanent employment
is still present. We also ﬁnd that the impact of EP on total young employees is positive in bad
19If we are ready to assume some kind of discrimination in the labour market between male and female employees,
this ﬁnding may also be interpreted as an increase in temporary female hirings when the economy is subject to a
positive labour demand shock and ﬁrms are short of labour. This explanation may well account for the higher EP
coeﬃcients in the case of female employment with respect to the total (M+F), meaning that less stringent protection
legislation is in fact correlated with more female than male dismissals.
20states of the economy. In other words, the employment protection nature of insider regulations is
eﬀective in reducing dismissals of young employees during bad states.
Focusing on the impact of ﬁxed term contracts regulations FTC, we ﬁnd that stricter FTC
causes a reduction in young temporary employment, as expected. Moreover, this is associated with
a reduction in young permanent employment as well. This piece of evidence conﬁrms that, for young
employees, temporary employment on ﬁxed term contracts may be an eﬀective means to obtain
a permanent job20. It follows that less stringent regulations produce an increase in permanent as
well as temporary young employment which is reﬂected in the increase of total young employment
population ratios. The asymmetric impact of FTC in diﬀerent states of the economy is conﬁrmed,
although the FTC coeﬃcient is lower but still negative in bad states.
The temporary work agencies regulations’coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcant, with stricter TWA
increasing young permanent employment while reducing young temporary employment. The net
eﬀect on young total employment is given by column 6.G, where higher TWA ﬂexibility induces
an increase in young total employment. Unlike in previous tables, the eﬀect is still present in good
states, but weaker. These results imply that, contrary to what was found for FTC, less stringent
TWA have a positive impact on young total employment at the expense of young permanent
employment. In other words, the role played by ﬁxed term contracts in creating the conditions for
young employees to switch to permanent jobs is doubtful with regard to TWA21. The implications
of these two alternative ways of using short term contracts with young employees therefore seem
to be diﬀerent, and they should be investigated further at a micro level.
As regards the other institutional regressors, the output of Table 6 is not particularly dissim-
ilar from that of previous tables. Perhaps the only points worth making are that union density
is positively correlated with young permanent employment and negatively with young temporary
employment, with an ambiguous net eﬀect on the total. Coordination has a positive eﬀect on both
types of employment, similarly to that found for female employees, i.e. in column 6.F. The inter-
action term UDCO’s coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcant, which shows that higher coordination reduces
union aversion towards temporary employment among the young.
3.4 Speciﬁcation and Diagnostic Tests
3.4.1 Poolability Tests
The estimation of a pooled model may yield more eﬃcient estimates at the expenses of biaseness.
We performed a battery of tests based on weak mean square errors (MSE) criteria which do not
test the falsity of the poolability hypothesis but permit one to choose between the constrained and
the unconstrained estimator on a pragmatic basis, i.e. on the basis of the trade-oﬀ between bias
and eﬃciency. We adopted the general version of the tests suggested by Baltagi (1995), under
the general assumption u  N(0,Ω), i.e. allowing heteroskedasticity and serial correlation across
countries.
The tests were calculated for a simpliﬁed version of our model, because we needed enough degrees
of freedom to estimate all the set of by country regressions. However we tested for poolability on
alternative simpliﬁed speciﬁcations in order to check the robustness of these results. We present
here, in Table 7, the second weak MSE criterion statistics λNT calculated for a simpliﬁed version
of our models A, B, C and D, with lagged dependent variable, beneﬁt replacement ratios, union
20This result is in line with the previous ﬁndings of Booth et al. (2000).
21In this respect, Blanchard and Landier (2001), although they do not diﬀerentiate between these two types of
regulations, provide an interesting analysis of the perverse implications of ﬂexible temporary employment standards,
with especial regard to France.
21A B C D E F G
EPOPperm EPOPtemp λ EPOP EPOPperm EPOPtemp EPOP
LDV 0.747 0.791 0.744 0.728 0.714 0.792 0.76
[12.59] [10.86] [10.98] [11.09] [11.61] [13.10] [11.41]
EP 5.399 -3.797 -9.769 3.921 4.645 -2.768 3.759
[1.88] [2.54] [2.67] [1.47] [1.56] [2.06] [1.37]
FTC -0.271 -0.035 0.008 -0.313 -0.214 -0.442 -0.59
[1.14] [0.25] [0.02] [1.45] [0.80] [2.96] [2.40]
TWA 0.548 -0.356 -0.727 0.09 0.318 -0.075 0.257
[2.87] [2.52] [2.40] [0.46] [1.05] [0.43] [1.05]
EP·BAD -0.188 0.111 0.058
[0.76] [0.90] [0.29]
FTC·BAD 0.036 0.522 0.437
[0.15] [4.40] [1.96]
TWA·BAD 0.352 -0.637 -0.432
[1.43] [4.75] [1.96]
BRR -12.524 -2.776 -2.969 -14.302 -12.467 -3.354 -14.461
[4.49] [1.75] [0.75] [4.99] [4.28] [1.99] [4.86]
BD -0.083 -2.019 -3.891 -1.849 0.937 -3.565 -2.752
[0.07] [2.39] [2.22] [1.38] [0.68] [4.48] [1.92]
UD 6.519 -17.435 -34.479 -0.711 0.941 -10.086 0.071
[0.97] [4.68] [3.78] [0.11] [0.12] [2.67] [0.01]
CO 2.572 -0.522 -1.832 2.731 1.736 0.794 3.4
[2.88] [1.01] [1.41] [3.28] [1.68] [1.40] [3.61]
TW -12.074 0.588 3.836 -9.017 -10.092 -1.552 -10.975
[3.01] [0.20] [0.57] [1.86] [2.40] [0.57] [2.24]
EPCO 1.898 -0.215 -1.04 3.78 1.638 1.384 4.717
[1.08] [0.22] [0.43] [2.36] [0.93] [1.53] [2.92]
BRRBD -3.94 -9.23 -17.572 -9.579 -4.69 -10.314 -11.005
[0.95] [4.02] [3.33] [2.41] [1.07] [4.65] [2.59]
UDCO 5.173 11.537 18.851 15.662 7.667 10.034 18.657
[0.58] [2.53] [1.68] [2.06] [0.84] [2.29] [2.31]
TWCO 3.156 4.062 7.919 -4.602 2.535 -0.398 -5.989
[0.36] [0.98] [0.76] [0.57] [0.29] [0.11] [0.74]
LDS 27.973 0.401 -1.243 28.824 26.247 1.529 28.018
[3.53] [0.09] [0.12] [4.02] [3.16] [0.42] [3.89]
TFPS 2.317 2.027 2.869 2.548 4.336 2.828 6.546
[0.44] [0.71] [0.41] [0.51] [0.66] [0.88] [1.07]
AMS 0.528 -0.687 -1.781 -0.496 0.403 -0.116 0.163
[0.48] [0.99] [1.07] [0.42] [0.32] [0.19] [0.13]
RIRL 6.298 2.562 3.976 -1.513 2.674 -1.588 -4.855
[1.00] [0.72] [0.45] [0.23] [0.35] [0.43] [0.69]
TTS -13.552 -2.682 -2.323 -15.023 -13.803 -1.962 -14.093
[2.74] [1.13] [0.39] [3.42] [2.57] [0.94] [3.00]
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
Countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Avg T 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12
WT e s tc o e ﬀ = 0 3490636 141690.3 116534 4096579 3569457 206818.4 4340367
χ2 d.o.f. 45 45 45 45 48 48 48
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W Test f.e.=0 32.38 79.28 56.05 18.06 33.19 70.63 18.74
χ2 d.o.f. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
Table 4: GLS ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the impact of employment regulations on total (M+F)
employment population ratios
22A B C D E F G
EPOPperm EPOPtemp λ EPOP EPOPperm EPOPtemp EPOP
LDV 0.793 0.849 0.76 0.733 0.773 0.832 0.741
[13.99] [8.55] [9.29] [13.21] [13.41] [9.33] [12.96]
EP 7.995 -2.869 -11.369 5.873 7.736 -2.638 5.558
[2.66] [1.79] [2.12] [2.27] [2.52] [1.77] [2.02]
FTC 0.015 -0.158 -0.19 -0.063 0.246 -0.422 -0.122
[0.06] [1.16] [0.39] [0.33] [0.90] [2.81] [0.54]
TWA 0.267 -0.326 -0.841 -0.218 -0.095 0.156 -0.015
[1.39] [2.10] [2.19] [1.32] [0.32] [0.83] [0.07]
EP·BAD -0.287 0.375 0.198
[1.21] [2.87] [0.97]
FTC·BAD -0.26 0.202 0.035
[1.03] [1.57] [0.17]
TWA·BAD 0.501 -0.648 -0.261
[2.14] [4.66] [1.31]
BRR -10.304 -2.64 -0.67 -11.493 -9.014 -4.498 -12.354
[4.05] [1.48] [0.12] [4.56] [3.38] [2.48] [4.46]
BD -1.28 -2.4 -4.631 -2.685 -0.602 -3.377 -3.326
[1.24] [2.38] [1.96] [2.25] [0.49] [3.52] [2.51]
UD 19.662 -12.702 -35.025 10.682 15.328 -5.667 12.166
[2.92] [3.32] [2.76] [1.87] [2.16] [1.38] [1.87]
CO 1.953 -0.254 -2.578 1.481 1.247 0.922 1.804
[2.33] [0.45] [1.39] [2.00] [1.30] [1.53] [2.09]
TW -3.778 0.999 4.354 0.127 -2.775 0.442 -1.149
[0.97] [0.29] [0.42] [0.03] [0.67] [0.13] [0.23]
EPCO 0.961 -0.399 -3.749 1.157 0.156 0.721 1.324
[0.54] [0.39] [1.12] [0.76] [0.09] [0.73] [0.84]
BRRBD -0.066 -5.855 -11.471 -4.979 1.701 -6.903 -6.54
[0.02] [2.19] [1.57] [1.44] [0.42] [2.64] [1.65]
UDCO -0.663 8.735 11.08 9.26 -1.852 6.067 9.507
[0.08] [1.85] [0.70] [1.25] [0.21] [1.29] [1.19]
TWCO 9.126 6.151 21 11.851 9.393 4.502 12.829
[1.01] [1.39] [1.50] [1.54] [1.08] [1.08] [1.59]
LDS 32.408 8.74 14.32 33.404 31.186 10.334 34.232
[3.92] [1.94] [0.98] [4.49] [3.68] [2.48] [4.58]
TFPS -10.946 1.124 6.045 -8.514 -14.618 1.33 -6.544
[2.04] [0.38] [0.61] [1.74] [2.24] [0.38] [1.06]
AMS 3.811 -0.457 -3.212 2.441 3.025 -0.182 2.4
[2.99] [0.60] [1.38] [2.09] [2.17] [0.26] [1.89]
RIRL 0.068 2.444 10.144 -6.059 1.358 3.076 -4.36
[0.01] [0.63] [0.81] [0.98] [0.19] [0.77] [0.66]
TTS -5.355 0.369 2.563 -5.132 -5.939 -1.109 -6.017
[1.03] [0.15] [0.31] [1.18] [1.10] [0.45] [1.26]
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
Countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Avg T 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12
WT e s tc o e ﬀ = 0 2265729 120888.2 110082.7 3275737 2243837 173599.2 3256086
χ2 d.o.f. 45 45 45 45 48 48 48
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W Test f.e.=0 55.6 51.73 54.35 36.21 57.64 41.41 30.34
χ2 d.o.f. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
Table 5: GLS ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the impact of employment regulations on female employment
population ratios
23A B C D E F G
EPOPperm EPOPtemp λ EPOP EPOPperm EPOPtemp EPOP
LDV 0.853 0.709 0.645 0.755 0.853 0.744 0.808
[19.72] [8.64] [6.07] [12.15] [19.25] [11.62] [12.83]
EP 8.59 -3.991 -12.014 7.521 9.825 -4.43 7.174
[2.11] [0.90] [0.63] [1.47] [2.40] [1.18] [1.48]
FTC -0.687 -1.096 -4.127 -1.166 -0.477 -1.789 -1.715
[2.43] [2.98] [2.35] [3.04] [1.48] [4.68] [4.23]
TWA 1.533 -0.653 -1.885 0.46 1.297 0.038 1.334
[6.23] [1.72] [1.14] [1.24] [3.54] [0.09] [3.20]
EP·BAD -0.183 0.408 0.763
[0.61] [1.26] [2.26]
FTC·BAD -0.3 1.151 0.689
[0.98] [3.63] [1.83]
TWA·BAD 0.251 -1.625 -1.733
[0.78] [4.86] [4.67]
BRR -16.288 -4.131 6.446 -25.15 -15.638 -7.782 -27.12
[4.04] [0.95] [0.36] [4.94] [3.83] [1.77] [5.43]
BD 4.623 -5.184 -15.631 -2.485 4.214 -9.452 -6.284
[2.77] [2.24] [1.83] [0.96] [2.21] [4.10] [2.28]
UD 14.109 -34.169 -30.887 -9.587 15.175 -21.661 0.131
[1.57] [3.20] [0.63] [0.73] [1.58] [2.11] [0.01]
CO 2.837 -0.392 -2.803 4.027 3.11 2.922 6.952
[2.25] [0.28] [0.44] [2.65] [2.19] [2.05] [4.44]
TW -28.846 6.688 29.232 -23.546 -29.959 -0.34 -29.467
[5.24] [0.87] [1.08] [2.80] [5.11] [0.05] [3.73]
EPCO -1.641 -0.385 -0.956 2.017 -1.638 3.909 4.762
[0.67] [0.13] [0.07] [0.70] [0.67] [1.50] [1.78]
BRRBD -6.399 -13.58 -19.204 -23.837 -4.551 -17.508 -27.876
[1.17] [2.18] [0.73] [3.22] [0.81] [2.93] [3.79]
UDCO -8.232 25.307 18.496 2.479 -10.433 27.79 7.356
[0.72] [2.04] [0.32] [0.18] [0.92] [2.41] [0.49]
TWCO 13.501 12.909 1.297 -1.621 11.16 2.311 -3.35
[1.10] [0.91] [0.02] [0.11] [0.92] [0.19] [0.26]
LDS 34.436 10.547 15.132 48.795 34.895 9.604 45.163
[3.46] [0.89] [0.30] [3.81] [3.53] [0.92] [3.67]
TFPS 6.473 1.228 -18.638 7.98 -0.525 4.643 15.079
[0.94] [0.15] [0.54] [0.89] [0.06] [0.52] [1.45]
AMS 1.221 -0.488 2.103 -1.839 0.608 0.324 -0.066
[0.69] [0.23] [0.23] [0.83] [0.32] [0.17] [0.03]
RIRL 16.629 3.921 -24.082 12.244 18.059 -3.763 10.817
[1.82] [0.38] [0.51] [1.07] [1.83] [0.39] [0.93]
TTS -32.259 -6.28 19.372 -40.896 -32.435 -8.204 -42.526
[4.88] [0.87] [0.59] [5.09] [4.78] [1.36] [5.47]
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
Countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Avg T 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12
WT e s tc o e ﬀ = 0 1016440 53793.9 41955.83 947201.7 1008896 102564.1 1183741
χ2 d.o.f. 45 45 45 45 48 48 48
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W Test f.e.=0 99.98 43.96 10.32 25.4 94.87 43.26 26.94
χ2 d.o.f. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
Table 6: GLS ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the impact of employment regulations on the 15-24 years
old employment population ratios
24λNT (N − 1)K /2
Pooled Speciﬁcation is best
according to 2nd weak MSE criterion
( λNT ≤ (N − 1)K /2)
Model 4.A 1.54 28 yes
Model 4.B 0.77 28 yes
Model 4.C 0.79 28 yes
Model 4.D 1.62 28 yes
Model 5.A 1.33 28 yes
Model 5.B 0.19 28 yes
Model 5.C 0.69 28 yes
Model 5.D 1.28 28 yes
Model 6.A -12 28 yes
Model 6.B 0.73 28 yes
Model 6.C 0.96 28 yes
Model 6.D 1.51 28 yes
Table 7: Poolability tests based on second weak MSE criterion
density, tax wedge, LD shock and TFP shock as regressors. We found that under the ﬁrst as well
as the second weak MSE criterion the pooled estimator is better than the unconstrained estimator
in all cases. In other words the pooled model yields more eﬃcient estimates than the by country
regressions.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue, however, that a pooled estimator is potentially inconsistent
when the model is dynamic and parameter heterogeneity is not taken into account. Indeed, our esti-
mations were derived from a set of semi-pooled equations, where we allowed for some heterogeneity
in the parameters, through country speciﬁc coeﬃcients and interactions among institutions. This
is an important feature of the model which makes it robust to the potential inconsistency described
above.
3.4.2 Estimation of the Small T Bias in Dynamic Panels
The short time dimension of our panel of countries and the partial adjustment speciﬁcation of our
model suggest that the estimated coeﬃcients could be aﬀected by the Nickell bias for dynamic pan-
els. Nickell (1981) shows that in the AR(1) case the bias of a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect model is O(1/T)
and therefore becomes less important as T grows. Our dataset is characterised by an average
number of country observations equal to 11.25, therefore the issue deserves some investigation.
Kiviet (1995) addresses the problem by measuring the performance of a set of alternative esti-
mators on panels with ﬁxed N and T dimensions, with N>T . His Monte Carlo analysis shows
that in this context, although biased, the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator (henceforth LSDV) has the lowest
small sample variance compared with alternative consistent estimators like Anderson Hsiao IV, and
Arellano Bond GMM. This result suggests that correcting the LDSV estimate for the bias would
result in a more eﬃcient ﬁnite sample estimator (LSDVc) with respect to IV and GMM alternatives,
on a mean square error criterion basis.
Judson and Owen (1999) test the performance of the Kiviet LDSVc estimator and the alterna-
tives by means of Monte Carlo simulations, concentrating on panels with typical macroeconomic
dimensions, i.e. small N and T,w i t hN   T. Their analysis conﬁrms the well known fact that the
lagged dependent variable coeﬃcient bias is more severe than the bias of the explanatory variables’
coeﬃcients for all alternative estimators in the case of panel dimensions comparable with ours.
This result gives us some conﬁdence in the interpretation of the estimated impact of institutions on
25the dependent variable. They suggest moreover that the LSDVc estimator outperforms alternative
estimators, when T<30, while the LSDV estimator performs as well as or better than many
alternatives when T = 30.
However, application of the LDSVc technique to our data is not free from problems. First,
this estimator requires the data to be balanced across panels and an analogous methodology for
unbalanced panels has not yet been derived. Our database is unbalanced with Tmax = 13 and
Tmin = 9, so that dropping the year observations unavailable for some of the countries would result
in a dramatic loss of information. Moreover, the testing procedure of this section conﬁrms that by
country heteroskedasticity and serial correlation is likely to occur and the LDSVc estimator is not
as eﬃcient as the ﬁxed eﬀects GLS estimator (LSDVGLS) in correcting for this. The reason for
this deﬁciency is that although a White robust version of the estimator can be derived, this does
not incorporate the information on the nature of the heteroskedasticity in the data, that is likely
to be of an ”across groups” type, as the tests show.
Given the limitations on application of the LDSVc estimator, Judson and Owen suggest the
adoption of a one step Arellano Bond procedure for small samples with T ≤ 10. However, the
Arellano Bond estimator is constructed for applications to datasets with ﬁxed T and large N, and
its adoption on a panel like ours is not advisable.
We decided to follow an approach similar to Kiviet’s. We present a set of LSDVGLS estimations,
correcting for by country heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and at the same time we produce
an approximate boundary for the bias using Kiviet’s formula on the analogous balanced LDSV
estimates. The calculated Kiviet bias is strictly greater than our model’s bias for two reasons.
First, the bias is calculated for a balanced country panel with T = Tmin of our actual unbalanced
panel. This means that the bias in our estimates should be consistently lower than this estimated
upper boundary, since we dropped one third of the available observations in order to balance the
panel. In other words our estimations were calculated on a dataset with longer time series for
most of the countries, and 50% more observations than the data used for the calculations of the
Kiviet bias. Secondly, the LSDVc bias estimate is White robust but not corrected for by country
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 8 presents the estimated Kiviet bias22 for models A and B calculated for total, female,
and young employment population ratios. The estimated bias is expressed in percentage terms, i.e.
it is calculated as
∧
Kbias(β)= |
ˆ βLSDV − ˆ βLSDV c
ˆ βLSDV
| (22)
where ˆ βLSDV is the usual LSDV or ﬁxed eﬀect estimate on the balanced model, and ˆ βLSDV c
is the Kiviet corrected estimate, LSDVc. A positive value of
∧
Kbias(β) indicates that the true
parameter is likely to be larger in absolute terms than the LSDV estimate, and vice versa for a
negative value. For the reasons mentioned above, the potential bias in the estimated coeﬃcients of
















Bearing this in mind and referring to the estimated percent bias of Table 8, we can conclude
that our estimations are unlikely to be largely aﬀected by the Nickell bias. The only estimated
22The calculation of the Kiviet correction for the bias involves an estimate of the equation error vector and its
variance. We follow Judson and Owen and choose Anderson Hsiao IV among all possible consistent estimators in
order to generate it.
















4.A 4.B 5.A 5.B 6.A 6.B
Total Female Young
EPOPperm EPOPtemp EPOPperm EPOPtemp EPOPperm EPOPtemp
LDV 722.5 -18.6 -212.7 -26.8 -66.9 -25.6
EP -16.8 12.1 -83.7 -65.5 -8.3 -13.6
FTC -21.6 20.2 -37.9 48.5 -23.6 14.7
TWA 11.3 15.2 -8.4 20.9 -28.1 18.3
BRR 14.8 -54.8 34.7 -14.6 10.1 -53.7
BD 30.2 2.1 332.8 1.4 -13.3 1.8
UD 9.1 -21.8 85.9 -11.4 20.7 -6
CO -13.3 44.2 -2.6 -8.3 1.5 18.9
TW 27.4 0.5 77.4 -6.2 0.7 -0.3
LDS 38.1 -10.6 55.5 -22.7 0.3 -17
TFPS 2.5 19.2 -47.3 7.6 -11.2 15.2
AMS -32.2 9.8 -28.5 15.2 -19.3 22.7
RIRL 2.8 -7.9 -36.1 -13.4 -21 -25.5
TTS 2.5 226.8 -31.3 95.9 -18.5 235.5
Table 8: Estimated Kiviet bias: direction and percent value
Model














































Table 9: Groupwise heteroskedasticity LR tests
coeﬃcient to be at risk is the lag dependent variable, and this is exactly what the econometric
theory predicts in these cases.
3.4.3 Heteroskedasticity
The ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation assumes homoskedasticity of the stochastic component in the regres-
sion error across countries and time. If the assumption is not met, then the estimates will still
be consistent but ineﬃcient. We therefore test for groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity in
the LSDV version of our equations. The test is chi-squared distributed with G − 1 degrees of free-
dom, where G is the number of groups in the sample, 9 countries in our case. Table 9 presents the
Likelihood Ratio test statistics for our LSDV estimated models. The null hypothesis of homoskedas-
ticity across countries is rejected in all cases. This suggests the adoption of a feasible LSDVGLS
estimator, with a general variance covariance matrix that incorporates heteroskedasticity across
countries.
3.4.4 Residuals Serial Correlation
In order to test for serial correlation in ﬁxed eﬀects models, Baltagi and Li (1995) suggest an LM test
whose asymptotic distribution is calculated for T large. The null hypothesis is no serial correlation,
assuming the residuals are either AR(1) or MA(1). The evidence for both versions of the test
27Model














































Table 10: Maddala and Wu panel cointegration tests
on every LSDV estimated model is mixed. However, given the relatively short T dimension of our
sample, and the asymptotic nature of the test, we preferred to implement a general form of our ﬁxed
eﬀect GLS estimator, allowing for possible serial correlation as well as groupwise heteroskedasticity.
3.4.5 Panel Cointegration
We tested for panel cointegration using the procedure suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999) using
previous ﬁndings by Fisher (1932). Their test is a combination of by country unit roots tests, each
with P-value Pi , into the statistic −2

logPi. The latter has an exact χ2 distribution with 2N
degrees of freedom, since in our models we control for cross country correlation by means of time
dummies. Using an augmented Dickey Fuller test with trend as by country test, and MacKinnon
approximate P-values, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in all cases. Although the
validity of these tests can be questioned given the short dimension of each country’s time series,
they are in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature such as Nickell et al. (2001), where the
same test was performed with very similar results, on twenty OECD countries, each observed for a
much longer period (T   31).
4 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a theoretical as well as empirical analysis of the impact of employment reg-
ulations on permanent and temporary employment. We have considered three diﬀerent types of
regulations, namely insiders protection, ﬁxed term contract regulations, and temporary work agen-
cies legislation. The predicted eﬀect of these institutions on the level of the two types of employment
and on the total are not always unambiguous. Increased labour market ﬂexibility based on relax-
ation of the constraints governing these three institutions has diﬀerent eﬀects according to worker
types and the state of the economy. Besides, the results depend also on whether the constraint on
temporary work is binding or not. These results are summarised in Table 1 where we show that
permanent and temporary employment may well move in opposite directions, suggesting that the
net eﬀects of less stringent employment regulations should be determined at the empirical level.
We tested the implications of the theoretical model in the second section of the paper, performing
a ﬁxed eﬀect GLS estimation on employment population ratios calculated for total, permanent and
temporary employment as well as for diﬀerent employees’types, namely total (M + F), female and
young (15 - 24). The main results of the analysis, summarised in Table 11, are the following:
Total employment population ratios (M+F)
1. Less stringent employment protection regulations have a signiﬁcant negative impact on per-
manent employment population ratios. However, they have a signiﬁcant positive impact on
temporary employment population ratios, with a resulting insigniﬁcant eﬀect on total em-
ployment.
28EP FTC TWA
All N +( * ) + (**)
n - (**) - (**)
L
Female N + (**)
n - (*) - (**)
L + (**)
Young N + (**) -(**) + (**)
n -(**) - (*)
L -(**)
Sign of coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance (* 10%; ** 5%)
Table 11: Empirical predictions of the eﬀects of labour market institutions on employment
2. Less stringent ﬁxed term contracts regulations have a signiﬁcant positive impact on tem-
porary and total employment in good states of the economy, with no eﬀects on permanent
employment.
3. Less stringent temporary work agencies regulations have an incremental eﬀect on temporary
and total employment in bad states. When the model does not control for asymmetric eﬀects
in good and bad states, the impact on permanent employment is negative.
4. Higher unemployment beneﬁt replacement rates reduce both permanent and temporary em-
ployment. This eﬀect is reinforced when beneﬁt durations are longer.
5. The tax wedge and bargaining coordination have a signiﬁcant impact on permanent employ-
ment only, with respectively negative and positive coeﬃcients.
6. Unions seem to be averse to temporary employment, at least over the time span observed here.
The negative impact of stronger unions on temporary employment is, however, mitigated by
closer coordination.
Female employment population ratios
7. Less stringent employment protection legislation is correlated with a reduction in female
permanent and total employment and an increase in temporary employment. The negative
impact on permanent employment seems to be stronger in the case of females, suggesting
that employment protection legislation may play a major role in maintaining women at work
on a permanent basis.
8. Greater union density has a positive signiﬁcant impact on female permanent employment,
maintaining a negative eﬀect on female temporary employment.
9. A positive labour demand shock induces an increase in total permanent employees (M+F).
However, the eﬀect is also signiﬁcant on temporary employees when only females are taken
into account.
Young employment population ratios (15 - 24)
2910. Less stringent employment protection has a negative impact on permanent employment.
When a distinction is drawn between good and bad states, this eﬀect is conﬁrmed in good
states only. The eﬀect on total employment among young people is also negative, only in bad
states.
11. Less stringent ﬁxed term contract regulations cause an increase in both young temporary and
permanent employment, conﬁrming that a ﬁxed term contract may be an eﬀective means to
obtain a permanent job for young people.
12. The eﬀect of temporary work agency regulations is diﬀerent. In this case, less stringent
regulations induce an increase in young temporary employment together with a reduction
in young permanent employment. In other words the role played by ﬁxed term contracts in
creating the conditions for young employees to switch to a permanent job is doubtful with
regard to temporary work agencies.
Flexibility in European labour markets has been attained more by deregulating the hiring mech-
anism than by reducing permanent employment protection (see Table 3). In our terms, FTC and
TWA have been the main forms of intervention in recent decades. According to our analysis,
this strategy has contradictory consequences: on the one hand ﬁxed term contracts may represent
a viable access channel to a permanent job, especially for young employees; on the other hand,
temporary work agencies may indeed increase temporary employment, but only at the expenses
of permanent employment. As regards employment protection legislation, this seems to eﬀectively
induce an increase in permanent employment. Its counterpart is a reduction in temporary employ-
ment with an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the total.
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32Appendix
A The Derivatives with Respect to λ
In order to analyse the consequences of looser temporary contracts constraints, we can diﬀerentiate
















+ A)(λ + Xs)
(b)
where we wrote Xs for Xs(φ,µ). If Qs(λ) > 0, then permanent employment increases.




1−ρ. We analyse the sign of dNs
dλ
in equation a for two particular values of λ: when it is equal to zero (no temporary contracts





1−ρ, see equation 8.
When λ tends to zero, from equation b we can easily obtain that Q(λ) > 0, given that the limit
of the ﬁrst term in the numerator tends to inﬁnity. It follows that dN
d(λ) > 0.

















which is unambiguously negative.
We may conclude that there should exist a λ
∗
that maximizes permanent employment. For
realistic parameter values this must be very close to zero. For instance, with A =1 .2,X=1 .1,
ρ =0 .93, γ =0 .75, permanent employment is at its maximum level for λ
∗
=0 .001. Other
simulations carried out for ρ>0.9 show that this level is always below 0.005. It follows that
permanent employment should decrease when λ grows23.








which, given the deﬁnition of dN






+( 1− γ)XsA − γAλ




Let us analyse the numerator of the latter expression. Xsλ
ρ
− γAλ>0 is a suﬃcient condition





1−ρ,w h i c hi s
higher than the optimum value of ¯ λ deﬁned in equation 8. Hence, when the binding constraint is
relaxed, temporary employment grows.
23Only if γ is very near to ρ the employment maximizing value of the constraint on temporary contract (λ
∗
)
becomes higher. For instance, for γ =0 .92 and ρ = .93, we obtain λ
∗
=0 .08.












which, after the substitution of dN






+( 1− γ)XsA − γAλ + γXsλ
ρ−1
− (1 − γ)λ
ρ
− A




The sign of this expression is positive for λ → 0, since dN
dλ and dn
dλ are both positive for λ small.
Let us evaluate the derivative in a neighbourhood of the value of ¯ λ that ﬁrms would have
chosen in absence of regulations. Substituting this value (see equation 8) in the latter expression


















The sign of this condition depends on Xs, i.e. on the relative labour cost ratio of permanent workers
with respect to temporary ones. Assuming that the permanent workers’wage is almost equal to
the temporary workers’wage plus their hiring cost (i.e. assuming µ   1), then the variable Xs is
greater than one in good states and lower than one in bad states. If this is the case, we can conclude
that when the constraints on temporary contracts are relaxed, total employment will rise in good
states (XG > 1) and decrease in bad states (XB < 1). If temporary workers always cost more than
permanent ones, then an excessive liberalisation of temporary contracts will induce a reduction in
total employment. In this case, there exists a binding limit on the adoption of temporary contracts
that maximize total employment. We then have that:
dLs
dλ
> 0 for λ → 0 for s= G,B
dLs
dλ
< 0 for λ → λs if Xs < 1 for s= G,B
As regards temporary workers,less stringent restrictions on the adoption of temporary contracts
imply an increase in temporary employment, i.e.:
dns
dλ
> 0 for s= G,B .
Permanent employment is negatively aﬀected by an higher λ. There exists a λ that maximizes




> 0 for λ → 0
dNs
dλ
< 0 for λ → λs for s= G,B .
B Data on Employment Regulations
B.1 Fixed Term Contract Regulation
Source: Belot and van Ours (2000) and authors.
34Purpose:
0-N ol i m i t
1 - Speciﬁc restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 - Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary
replacement of a worker)
2 - Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 - Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4-N o ta l l o w e d
-1 - If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist otherwise)
Duration:
0-N ol i m i t
1 - Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2-N or e n e w a lp o s s i b l e
B.2 Temporary Work Agencies Regulation
Source: Belot and van Ours (2000) and authors.
Purpose:
0-N ol i m i t
1 - Speciﬁc restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 - Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary
replacement of a worker)
2 - Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 - Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4-N o ta l l o w e d
-1 - If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist otherwise)
Duration:
0-N ol i m i t
1 - Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2-N or e n e w a lp o s s i b l e
B.3 Employment Protection
Source: Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and OECD (1994, 1999)
0-3: Regular procedural inconveniences: procedures
Days: Regular procedural inconveniences: delay to start of notice
Months: Notice period for no-fault individual dismissals
Months: Severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals
0-3: Diﬃculty of dismissal: deﬁnition of unfair dismissal
Months: Diﬃculty of dismissal: trial period24
Months: Diﬃculty of dismissal: compensation after 20 years of work with the employer
0-3: Diﬃculty of dismissal: reinstatement
24Note that by ”Trial period” is meant ”the max lenght of the period after hiring during which an appeal against
dismissal on grounds of unfairness cannot be made”, from OECD (1994).
35Year Change
Fixed Term Contracts 1984 liberalization
1994 restriction
Temporary Work Agencies 1994 introduction
Table 12: Major Institutional Changes in Spain: Fixed Term Contracts and Temporary Work
Agencies Regulation
Year Temporary Contracts




Table 13: Evolution of Temporary Contracts in Spain: 1983-1999
C Fixed Term Contracts and Temporary Work Agencies Indica-
tors for Spain
Belot and van Ours (2000) data on Fixed Term Contracts and Temporary Work Agencies Regulation
do not provide information on Spain. However, given the peculiarities of the labour market reforms
implemented in Spain in the last twenty years, excluding this country from our sample would entail
losing a signiﬁcant part of the information on temporary work in Europe. We therefore constructed
a Fixed Term Contracts and a Temporary Work Agencies indicator for Spain using the same criteria
as Belot and Van Ours.
Garcia-Serrano and Jimeno (1998) provide detailed information on the evolution of Spanish
labour market institutions over the estimation period; information which is summarised in Table
12.
Since approval of the Workers’Statute in 1980, some ﬂexibility features have been introduced
into Spain’s rigid labour market institutional framework. Fixed term contracts were liberalised
in 1984, which caused a boom in this form of employment (see Table 13) and forced the Spanish
government to take action to promote the diﬀusion of permanent jobs. In 1994, the government
introduced measures to restrict the use of temporary contracts, obtaining some partial success given
that the ratio of temporary contracts to the total decreased by 2.3% in 1999. Another step towards
ﬂexibility has been the introduction of Temporary Work Agencies in 1994, by legislation with an
intermediate degree of ﬂexibility25. According to current legislation, ﬁrms may use temporary
labour for stated reasons, and they must resolve the temporary contract within a predetermined
period of time26. The values of the resulting indicators for Spain are summarised in Table 2.
25Del Boca and Zaniboni (1999) provide a descriptive account of diﬀerent degrees of rigidity in thel e gal framework
regulating temporaryw ork agencies in Europe.T h e OECD Job StudyP art II (1994) sets out indicators and country
rankingsr e l a t i v et oﬁ xed term contracts and temporaryw ork agencies regulation, calculated for the institutional
framework of thel a t e1 9 80s.
26These reasons are: (i) probationary period before permanent hiring (maximum sixm onths), (ii) extraordinary
operation (with at e mporary contract expiring at thee n do ft heo p e r a t i o n ) , (iii) market related needs (sixm onths’
maximum duration), (iv) substitution during leave (with a maximum duration corresponding to thep e r i o do fl e a v e ) .
36